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THE EFFECT OF INSIDER TRADING RULES
ON THE INTERNAL EFFICIENCY OF THE
LARGE CORPORATIONt
Robert J. Haft*

"Insiders" - directors, officers, and employees of a corporation
- cannot use material nonpublic infi;>rmation about the corporation
when trading in the organized securities markets. They must either
disclose the information or abstain from trading their corporation's
stock. 1
Professor Kenneth Scott recently summarized the three primary
justifications for this rule. 2 First, the "Fair Play" rationale posits
that taking advantage of inside information that is unavailable to
other parties is inherently inequitable. This "one-on-one" perspective asserts that insiders unfairly obtain benefits from and damage
the public investor on the other side of the trade. A variation of the
Fair Play rationale speaks of the "integrity of the securities markets": If the public believes that the game is unfair and chooses not
to play, the markets will suffer and the efficient allocation of capital
will be impeded.3 Second, the "Informed Market" rationale asserts

t
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I. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), ajfd in part, revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
In the only Supreme Court case defining "materiality" (and there, for the purposes of the
federal proxy rules), various formulations were used on the same page:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . It does not require
proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the
reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate is a showing
of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
"total mix" of information made available.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
2. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule J0b-5, .Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
801, 804 (1980).
3. Id at 804-09. Professor Scott states that the fair play and the integrity of the market
rationales stem from the idea that traders in the markets should have relatively equal access to
material information. Since the insider has unequal access, his trading is unfair.
Some co=entators, prominent among them Henry Manne, have objected that the only
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that prohibiting insider trading "removes an incentive to delay the
release of corporate information so that insiders may first take a
trading profit."4 The rule thus "facilitates the flow of information to
the market, so that it may better perform its functions of security
evaluation and capital allocation."5 Third, the "Business Property"
theory adopts the view that the insider trading ban "affords protection to the property rights of the firm in inside information . . . ."6
A seminal case held the rule applicable to "information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone." 7
effect the insiders' trades can have is to move the market in the correct direction, so that
the other party to the transaction, if affected at all, receives a better price than if the
insider had dutifully stayed out of the market. In that event, how can the other party
claim injury or show damages? . • •
• • • Most of the commentators who reject Manne's conclusions, as practically all of
them do, fall back at this point on simply asserting that insider trading is not right . . . •
Id at 807 (footnotes omitted). Scott argues that the individual investor is " 'protected' by the
price established by the market mechanism, not by his personal bargaining power or position. . . . Insider trading is hardly an unknown or unanticipated phenomenon; the returns
expected by investors would not include any gains unique to insiders." Id. at 808. Scott asserts that insiders' profits "do not necessarily represent some sort of 'unfair' or windfall gain
for them" because the prospect of insider trading profits is part of their total compensation.
Id "From a private standpoint, then, the fairness concern proves to have surprismgly little
substance, when viewed in terms of the game rather than as a single, isolated play." Id. at 809.
4. Id at 810 (emphasis in original). Professor Scott counters this rationale, in part, as
follows:
But let us examine further the proposition that [the insider trading ban] does serve to
reduce, at least to a small degree, delays in disclosure of available corporate information.
When the information is positive (giving rise to an increase in stock pnce), the proposition
is plausible; if insiders cannot profit from a trading delay, they otherwise nave ample
incentives to release promptly the information • • . . Good news benefits stockholders,
which usually include the insiders, and correlates with increases in management compen•
sation. But if the news is bad, the immediate incentives for insiders now point in the other
direction, and therefore it is to be expected that one should be quite sure of the facts
before making a release, which should be framed to avoid over-reactions by ill-informed
investors. In this situation, the [ban on insider trading] does not help, since insiders can
delay or avoid the negative disclosure simply by not tradini. Indeed, the rule makes the
situation somewhat worse, for by cutting off insider selling 1t also cuts off an activity that
is itself a source of information to the marketplace and removes an incentive for full
disclosure promptly upon completion of trading.
Id. at 810-11 (footnotes omitted).
5. Id. at 804, 809-14.
6. Id. at 804, 814-15. Professor Scott states:
In this view, the wrong committed is essentially that of theft or conversion. The information belongs to the firm, but an employee appropriates it for his own use and gain. Where
and how the trader acquired his knowledge, an aspect less central to the Fair Play or
Informed Market approaches becomes quite important, but whether the information is
inside or outside is unimportant. And in the tipping situation, the tippec is comparable to
one receiving stolen property.
Id. at 814. After reviewing the applicable case law, he concludes that the Business Property
"rationale, then, by no means applies to all the situations in which [the insider trading prohibition] has been invoked, but it provides clear guidance as to the function and the beneficiary of
the rule in some cases." Id. at 815.
1. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
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Academics have hotly debated these justifications for years, 8 and
none of the three has achieved universal acclaim. This Ar:ticle suggests another perspective: Prohibiting insider trading may enhance
business decision-making in large corporations. With the exception
of proponents of the Business Property view, analysts have focused
on how an insider trading rule affects the national securities markets
and traders in those markets. The internal governance of the large
corporation is a different matter, one deserving separate
consideration.

I.

CORPORATE DECISIONS BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED AT
THE LOWER LEVELS AND PASSED UPWARD

Whether business decisions will be correct depends directly on
the accuracy, quality, and timeliness of the information on which
they are based. In large corporations, this information may pass
through as many as fifteen hierarchical levels from bottom to top. 9
Organizational and communications scholars have confirmed the obvious: merely because the information is transmitted so many times,
the message becomes distorted. 10 They have also found that the per8. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (favoring insider trading); o. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 93-96 (1970);
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws,
93 HARV. L. REv. 322 (1979); Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule Ue-3 and Dirks: "Faimess" versus
Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982); Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic oj'the
Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 720; Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L.
REv. 547 (1970); Mendelson, The Economics oJ Insider Trading Reconsidered, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 470 (1969) (criticizing Manne); Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425 (1967) (criticizing Manne); Wang,
Trading on Material Nonpublic /'!formation on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and
Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10/J-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1217 (1981); Kripke, Book
Review, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 212 (1967) (criticizing Manne).
Professor Michael P. Dooley, in a recent and significant article, analyzes and roundly criticizes the justifications for the present prohibition. Dooley, E'!forcement oJInsider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1 (1980). He asserts that "the principal objection to insider trading
•.. ultimately rests on a view of insider trading as indulging one's self-interest to the point of
dishonesty." Id at 39. He then subjects this objection to an economic "agency cost" analysis
and later concludes that the objection is meritless.
9. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View oJ Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1138 (1977). The discussion in
Part I of this Article is premised on the existence of a large and complex organization and is
thus limited to the large corporation with many hierarchical levels. Part II, which focuses on
the small group of top-level corporate decision-makers, may well be applicable to large and
medium-sized corporations.
.
Some information relevant to business decisions may originate at the top of the corporation. See notes 25-26 infra and accompanying text. Such information usually relates to prospective tender offers or acquisitions, events that are far less common than top-level allocations
of corporate resources, long-term and strategic planning, marketing, product development, and
financing. These important but less spectacular decisions require information that proceeds
from lower levels to the top-level decision-makers.
10. See id at 1138.
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sonal biases and self-interest of each sender-subordinate and each
receiver-superior in the hierarchy exacerbate this obstacle to highquality business decisions. 11
Although decision-makers recognize this· distortion of information, they cannot completely counteract it. Superiors may reduce
distortion by counter-biasing or discounting the content of the
message by the ·self-interest that they perceive the sender to have in
the message. 12 Distortion may also be reduced to the extent that the
sender and receiver "trust" each other. 13 But the most common response to information distortion in complex organizations is to force
decision-making downward to specialists or to a unit closer to the
relevant information. 14 Downward delegation in complex organizations is efficient because the unit closest to the scene is the most
knowledgeable, its reaction time is short, and its reaction mode is
highly programmed.
Now, let us introduce a rule permitting securities trading by corporate employees, officers, and directors based on the material nonpublic information that they receive in the course of their
employment. This rule would likely impair corporate decision-making at all hierarchical levels. 15 Subordinates would stall the upward
11. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 81, 109-10 (1963); D,
KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 447 (2d ed. 1978); 0. WIL·
LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 122-24
(1975); Carter, The Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Top-Level Coporale JJecisions, 16 AD,
Sci. Q. 413, 421-27 (1971); Coffee, supra note 9, at 1137-38; Hoffman, Applying Experimental
Research on Group Problem Solving lo Organizations, IS J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL Sci, 375,
379-80 (1979); Stagner, Coporate JJecision Making: An Empirical Study, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCH.
1, 2 (1969).
12. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 11, at 77, 82, 110; w. MORRIS, DECENTRALIZATION
IN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 50-51 (1968). See Newman & Sussman, Controlling the Sycophant:
Policies and Techniques of Copora/ion Presidents, 43 S.A.M. ADVANCED MGMT. J. 14, 16-19
(1978).
13. Boss, Trust and Managerial Problem Solving Revisited, 3 GROUP & ORGANIZATION
STUDIES 331 (1978); Golembiewski & McConkie, The Centrality ofIntepersonal Trust in Group
Processes, in THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESSES 131, 158-63 (C. Cooper ed. 1975); Roberts &
O'Reilly, Failures in Upward Communication in Organizations: Three Possible Culprits, 11
AcAD. MGMT. J. 205, 208-09, 212-13 (1974); Zand, Trust alJd Managerial Problem Solving, 11
AD. Sc1. Q. 229 (1972).
14. The complex organization solves many problems involving uncertainty by forcing decision-making downward to the specialists or unit closest to the scene. Each unit deals with the
slice of the complex environment that the corporation has assigned to it and programs every•
thing else out The specialists "hedge" by making a decision with foreseeable short-term consequences. This permits fine-tuning from time to time based on continuous feedback. They
make decisions only when a problem arises, and their responses are usually highly programmed. The need to act quickly requires the lowest practicable organizational level to make the
decision. See E. LAWLER & J. RHODE, INFORMATION AND CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 19293 (1976); Van de Ven,A Panel Study on the Effects of Task Uncertainty, Interdependence, and
Size on Unit JJecision-Making, 8 0RG. & Ao. Sci. 237, 239, 244 (1977).
15. This idea was first suggested in 1970 by Professor Oliver Williamson, the noted econo-
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flow of critical information to maximize their opportunities for
financial gain. They would purchase stock when they received
"good" information - indicating favorable firm prospects - and
sell when they discovered "bad" information before transmitting the
information to other insiders who would drive the market price
higher by their purchases or lower by their sales. When the information is later publicly disseminated, the insiders would sell on the
good news or, if the news is bad, buy to "cover" their prior shortsales, 16 or do nothing if their prior sales were only of stock that they
owned at the time.
While the initial purchases or sales might occasion little delay short-sellers on "bad" information and purchasers on "good" information have an incentive to transmit information upward quickly 17
.- profit-maximizing insiders, before transmitting information upward, might attempt to arrange loans to purchase or sell a greater
amount of stock than their available resources would otherwise permit. Insiders might also convey the information to select corporate
outsiders to whom they owe favors or from whom they expect future
benefits. Even if the delay at each hierarchical level were slight, the
aggregate delay in upward transmission to the top decision-making
levels might be substantial. Assuming that higher level officials
make the important decisions, informational delay within the organization will also increase with the importance of the decision and its
likely impact on stock, as will the delay in releasing the information
to the public.
These incentives for delay and internal competition for insider
mist, as part of his critique of Professor Henry G. Manne's book in favor of insider trading.
On this point, Williamson stated:
It is not obvious that the information hoarding which insider trading would seem to require would also have ideal properties from the standpoint of the firm. The conflict is
between the necessity to provide "impacted" information (so as to prevent the disclosure
of significant developments to free riders) and the demands for effective information exchange within a complex, hierarchical organization. Can an information system be
designed for the unitary form organization that avoids the free-ride problem without impairing coordination and inducing subgoal pursuit of a debilitating sort? This seems
doubtful.
0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 8, at 9S.
16. "Short-selling" (on bad information) involves the sale of stock not owned by the seller.
The stock is borrowed by the seller from the brokerage firm through which the seller transacts
the short-sale. Later, when the market price falls, the short-seller "covers" the short-sale by
purchasing stock in the market at the lower price and delivering that stock to the broker. The
short-seller thus profits by the difference between the higher short-sale price and lower covering price. Section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits short-selling by any
director or officer (or beneficial owner of more than 10% of the stock) of the corporation.
Thus, profit maximization at the highest corporate levels in the case of bad information would
be limited by the number of shares owned by those insiders.
17. See note 19 U!fra and accompanying text.
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trading profits would increase the normal distortion in the upward
transmission of information. And the usual organizational countermeasures to informational distortion would likely fail. Superiors
would not know how nor in which direction to counter-bias or discount information because they could not accurately perceive the
subordinate's self-interest. Subordinates with incentives to delay or
compete may understate information or mislead superiors, while
others seeking quick profits may exaggerate the information to bring
about a rise in the stock price (or a fall if the information is "bad").
An increase in competition among hierarchical levels, moreover,
would reduce ''trust" between senders and receivers. And the relevant· superior might choose not to delegate decision-making downward even when delegation is the most efficient solution to
information distortion. The superior would have to weigh the personal benefit of less work resulting from that delegation against the
trading and informational opportunities delegation forecloses. All
things being equal, otherwise efficient downward delegation in the
complex organization would decrease.
Organizational efficiency is usually also promoted by the cohesiveness of the unit to which decision-making is delegated. Add the
potential for trading profits to the unit's previously efficient "program"18 for dealing with the complex environment, and the unifs
efficiency may diminish. And, as Part II will demonstrate, if the
members of the unit choose to capture such profits individually
rather than cooperatively, work groups will become less cohesive
and the quality of their decisions will fall.
The power to decide also implies the power to manipulate business decisions with an eye to potential trading profits. Although the
deciders could not manipulate often without being exposed for their
misdeeds and possibly fired, a few manipulations per level multiplied by the number of decision-making levels might substantially
injure the firm. The opportunity to manipulate, moreover, might
weigh against the.superior's otherwise efficient downward delegation
and thus further reduce the quality of corporate decision-making.
There are substantial constraints on this scenario of lessened efficiency and exacerbated-informational distortion. Insiders cannot unreasonably delay or grossly distort information in the authoritarian
and hierarchical organization that is the modem large corporation.
Their costs would be too high: loss of employment or reduced compensation. The delayers and distorters also could not adversely af18. See note 14.ru_pra.
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feet the organization ''too much," or else they might eliminate their
opportunity to profit in the future.
The potential of hierarchical levels to hoard information to maximize profits is also limited by the need of lower level purchasers and
short-sellers to transmit the information upward for more highly
profiled and publicly visible action by the higher levels. These visible actions will allow the lower level employees to realize gains in
the public markets by their offsetting sales or purchases after public
disclosure more quickly and without the uncertain investment risks
of delay. 19 Whether the balance of considerations would lead to
quicker and more accurate upward transmission of information is
the crux of the issue. The answer may depend on particular circumstances - the trading position taken and potential profits - and on
the nature of the particular information. While one can credibly argue that with a free trading rule good news would move up faster
(but with more "puffing") than it does today, I believe that on balance permitting insider trading would increase delay and distortion
and thus impair decision-making that depends on timely and accurate information from below.
When the higher levels do obtain the information, they will also
trade. But this may take its toll on the organizational morale below
because ultimately the higher echelons can use inside corporate information more effectively and profitably.20 Lower level insiders
will recognize that each succeeding level upward possesses greater
financial resources and over-all knowledge of corporate activities
than the last. They will thus know that the next level upward stands
to profit more and can react more effectively to the bits of information that the lower level receives.
·
What are some of the counter-arguments to the reduced organizational efficiency scenario? First, there is no direct empirical evidence to support it, either in the pre-prohibition experiences of
American corporations or in the experiences of corporations in countries with no prohibition. This must be conceded. But a partial answer is that data were never collected through the sieve that this
Article suggests. The present illegality of insider trading makes it unlikely that any meaningful empirical evidence can be obtained today
19. If the nonpublic material information was bad (i.e., unfavorable to the firm's prospects)
and the insider sold only the stock. that he then owned, there would be no countervailing need
to transmit the information upward for publicly visible action by the higher levels. In the case
of a short-sale by the insider, see note 16 supra, this countervailing need would exist.
20. See Schotland, supra note 8, at 1452.
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in the United States or in countries, such as Canada or Great Britain,
with roughly similar cultures that also prohibit insider trading.
Second, those corporations that insider trading may potentially
damage can voluntarily prohibit the practice.21 But who would
move particular corporations toward an insider trading ban? Would
the board of directors and chief executive voluntarily eliminate their
own potentially immense pro.fits under a laissezfaire rule when they
demanded contractual provisions prohibiting insider trading from
others? This seems doubtful. If they demanded such provisions from
employees but did not themselves agree to the trading restrictions,
resentment and cynicism would brew below, and the restrictions
would be counter-productive.
It requires strong faith in the efficiency of the free market to argue that the stock market or other markets might then punish the
nonsigning directors and top officers or the corporation itself and
eventually lead to the ouster, through a shareholder vote or takeover,
of those "errant" agents who continue to favor free trading for them. selves. Lower earnings or other economic benchmarks of poor performance would presumably signal to the market the internal
inefficiency caused by insider trading. But the market would not
usually be in a position to attribute the lower earnings to increased
informational distortion or delay because of many possible alternative explanations.22 Nor would the key managers, with their bia~
toward insider trading pro.fits, subjectively attribute the inefficiency
to less than optimal business decisions caused by increased informational distortion or delay.
Third, with insider trading by all employees, the higher echelons
arguably would learn about significant corporate events, through
the movement of the company's stock price, sooner and with less
distortion than they do today, given the present and pervasive up21. Professor Manne would undoubtedly concur with this suggestion. He has stated:
At no point in my entire book do I express the belief that corporations should be required
to tolerate insider trading.•.. [l]fthrough legal means a corporation properlf indicates
that its rule is no insider trading, that should be the business of that corporation and its
shareholders and the courts if a violation is alleged.
Manne, supra note 8, at 581 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Corporations would be
required to disclose publicly "whether or not insiders will be allowed to use information in the
stock market or under what conditions this will be allowed." Id
22. This discussion assumes that every corporation would be required to disclose publicly
whether and on what conditions it prohibits or allows insider trading. Requiring every insider
to report publicly his actual trading by a public filing would make additional information
available to the market See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1976) (requiring such a filing in the case of all trades by officers and directors). And if, in the
case of comparable corporations, some permitted insider trading, while others prohibited it,
the market (or its more sophisticated participants) might then be in a position to make accurate
attributions concerning informational distortion or delay.
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ward informational blockages. This position is a slight variation on
the efficient market argument that permitting insiders to trade on
material nonpublic information would tend to move the market in
the. correct direction. 23 The argument might hold in the intra-organizational context only in the unlikely event that all of the following
occur: (1) the lower levels are financially able to trade in relatively
large amounts so that the stock price may "signal" the upper levels;
(2) the upper levels actually monitor the stock price and volume; and
(3) the upper levels, on the basis of accurate information, are able to
exclude each of the following other plausible explanations for the
price movements: (a) outside sources are incorrectly interpreting information previously obtained from the company and its insiders;
(b) outside sources are incorrectly adopting tumors circulating in the
market; and (c) the lower levels are incorrectly interpreting the overall effect of tidbits of information.
Fourth, one might argue that under a laissezfaire trading rule the
upper levels would become better informed and less subject to informational blockages because of their .real incentives to dip down into
the hierarchy for critical information. The higher levels would then
trade accurately in large amounts and correctly signal the market as
to corporate developments. The argument is another efficient market variation, with the added bonus of increased organizational efficiency. These informational benefits to the organization and the ·
market may some day be convincingly demonstrated so as to overcome the decreased organizational efficiency argument, but I doubt
that this will occur.
Fifth, the decreased organizational efficiency argument assumes
the frequent flow at most hierarchical levels of "material" information; to the extent that this is not so, the posited injury to the organization is reduced. All levels receive far more mundane information
than information that is spectacular. Only rarely are low-level employees at the right spot at the right time to learn of a prospective
major earnings decline or dividend cut. And a GM machinist could
not confidently base a short-sale on his or a co-workers bad fit of a
screw into one car>s template.
Insider trading opportunities, however, do not usually depend on
23. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding that "even when
confronted with the possibility of a trade-off between fairness and economic efficiency, most
authorities appear to find that the balance tips in favor of discouraging insider trading" (footnote omitted)}; Manne, supra note 8, at 565-75; Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 260 (1968); Note, The .E.flicient Capital
Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation ofthe Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 1031, 1073 (1977).
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information that is material on its own. As Professor James Lorie,
the eminent economist, has stated: "With respect to the analysis of
securities, information is anything that changes the investor's subjective probability distribution with respect to future market prices or
retums." 24 Securities analysts profit today under Lorie's observation
by fitting tidbits of nonmaterial information legally provided to them
by insiders into the "mosaic" of publicly available information. Insiders at most hierarchical levels can probably fit their tidbits into
the mosaic of other nonpublic information that they acquire, so that
the totality would be in many cases "material." Furthermore, an insider who believes that particular information is "material" when it
is not, or is material only if other related information can be acquired, will have the same incentives to delay and distort the information as insiders who actually possess material information. Thus,
the decreased organizational efficiency argument does not wholly
rely on the upward flow of "material" information.

JI.

DECISION-MAKING AT THE TOP LEVEL

Most of the recent insider trading "scandals" involved nonpublic
information initially received at the highest levels in the corporation.
The information has often related to prospective tender offers, mergers, or acquisitions. 25 In these situations, if insider trading were
freely permitted such trading would "signal" the stock market that a
particular company will be the target of a tender offer or an acquisition proposal because the bidder or acquirer's directors and chief
executive would purchase target stock in large amounts and drive the
price up. If the bidder forewarned the target of its tender offer, the
target board and chief executive, assuming that they were willing to
"do business" with the prospective bidder, would also purchase target stock. Market efficiency in such a situation would be enhanced
by insider trading. 26
But an emphasis on the less spectacular aspects of corporate life
and top-level decision-making may be more significant. Most chief
executive or board decisions involve not tender offers or acquisitions,
24. Lorie, Insider Trading: Rule J0b-5, .Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 9 J,
LEGAL Snm. 819, 820 (1980).
25. See Keown & Pinkerton, Merc_er Announcements and Insider Trading Activil)': An Em-

pirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981); Louis, The Unwinnable War on Insider Trading,
FORTUNE, July 13, 1981, at 72 ("Of the 39 insider cases brought by the SEC since 1978, 27
were concerned with takeovers."); Editorial, Want a Hot Tip?, BARRONS, July 6, 1981, at 7.
26. The bidder corporation, however, may be harmed because it may have to raise its
planned offering price to reflect the increase in the target's stock price caused by the insider
purchases prior to the public announcement.
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but major allocations of corporate resources, long-term and strategic
planning, markets, products, and :financing.
Would a rule permitting insider trading affect this decision-making at the top level? Part I of this Article argued that top level decisions that are highly dependent on timely receipt of accurate
information from below would likely suffer because of the increased
delay and distortion in the upward transmission of the information.
But even assuming that laissezfaire insider trading would not result
in informational blockage or that this blockage could be counteracted, we must still consider the impact of permitting top-level insider trading on the quality of decision-making at the apex of the
largest American corporations.
Until recently, management dominated the boards of directors of
these corporations. As lower-rank officers and business associates of
the corporation, directors on the old board were generally beholden
to one "director," the chief executive. In contrast, the new board
now typically has a majority of directors who are "independent" of ·
management. It has emerged as a peer group - a collegial body of
equals, with the chief executive as the prima inter pares - and as
such is uniquely positioned to make business decisions of the highest
quality.27 The evidence from the behavioral sciences indicates that,
all other things being equal, the new board will make higher quality
decisions than both other ad hoc decision-making groups· in the corporation and individuals, including the chief executive. And, all
other things being equal, to the extent that the new board becomes
cohesive (which seems likely), the quality of its decisions will improve. Although the evidence to date is somewhat conflicting, the
new board is effectively beginning to assert greater power over the
course and direction of affairs in these corporations. If the behavioral science :findings hold, this trend is encouraging: to the extent
that the new board engages in decision-:making, the corporation will
be better off.
If we introduce a free insider trading rule into this cohesive peer
group and assume that information is distortion-free and timely, will
we impair the quality of decision-making? The answer might well
depend on whether the directors competed with each other for trading profits or agreed to cooperate and share the profits. Empirical
:findings drawn from the behavioral sciences, most notably social
27. This thesis and the assertions made in the balance of the paragraph in the text are
detailed in a previous article. See Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board· Beha11iora/ Science and Corporate Law, 80 MlcH. L. REv. 1 (1981).
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psychology, confirm our intuitions: competition among directors
would adversely affect their decision-making.
Competition among directors for trading pro.fits would create distrust in the group. As studies of business and other decision-making
groups have confinned,28 trust among_ the members of a group is an
essential precondition to quality decision-making. Distrustful group
members conceal or distort relevant information and disguise ideas
and conclusions to provide information that is low in accuracy, comprehensiveness, and timeliness. The distortion that they introduce
compounds the complexity and uncertainty inherent in every major
business decision, increasing the probability that underlying
problems will go undetected or avoided and making solutions more
difficult to identify. Such a group will seize an expedient solution to
end its problem task. Conversely, high-trust groups provide relevant, accurate, and timely information. Their members are also less
likely to misinterpret the intentions and behavior of others. Trust
among group members thus promotes identification and examination of underlying problems and generates solutions that are more
likely to be appropriate, creative, and long-range.
Closely related to distrust among group members is "opportunistic" behavior by members of peer groups. Professor Oliver E. Williamson, the noted economist, argues that such behavior impairs the
group's effectiveness. One of the three chief abuses that he notes is
'Joining the peer group in order to acquire knowhow and to learn
trade secrets, thereafter to set up a rival organization . . . . Disincentives must be devised to discourage members from joining for the
strategic purpose of acquiring learning-by-doing advantages, and
then resigning." 29 Members of insider trading peer groups will obtain greater pro.fits by remaining in the group than by resigning.
Nevertheless, Williamson's observation that opportunism detracts
from the group's effectiveness would still appear to hold.
Would the directors compete with each other for trading profits
or would they cooperate and agree to share their pro.fits and losses?
If they competed inter se, suspicion would prevail, undermining ·cohesiveness among group members and the quality of business decisions by the peer group at the corporate apex. If the directors (or a
majority of them) opted for a ''take the money and run" solution,
they might attempt to maximize individual pro.fits by competing over
the short term - until the shareholders or the market discovered the
28. See note 13 supra.
29. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note II, at 47-48.
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fact - rather than by cooperating over a longer term. Each director
would be strongly tempted to dip down into the hierarchy to discover the latest and best information on which to profit. In the process, a director might make alliances and side deals with those below
whom the director considered best for personal purposes. Competition might thus tum management information systems designed for
corporate purposes into stock niarket ticker tapes. The market
would arguably become more "efficient,'' but it is doubtful that the
corporation would become so.
.
Since low trust and opportunistic behavior appear to be detrimental to group effectiveness, and given the huge profit potential of
insider trading by directors, the directors might agree to cooperate as
a group rather than compete as individuals for these profits. Such
cooperation, which could be formalized by a contract among the directors to share profits (and losses), might well maintain group trust
and, through group-monitoring, reduce or eliminate individual opportunism. The director's incentive to do so would be strong because
of the direct relationships among board effectiveness, continuance in
office, and profit maintenance. The independent directors would
then carefully "monitor'' the chief executive's "performance,'' with
far greater incentives to do so than the present "directors-asmonitors" model contemplates.30
A legal rule imposing fiduciary duties on directors inter se could
then ensure the efficiency gains that this cooperative scenario might
provide by requiring insider trading to be cooperative. Relations
among directors would then resemble those among partners in a general partnership.31 However, such a scenario would destroy the
equality among directors underlying the findings of peer group superiority in decision-making.32 Even if we assume that the board
members would share their trading profits, the chief executive would
likely receive a greater partnership share than the others because of
his critical position in the information chain. Certain other directors
might be in a position to bargain for higher shares as well. With
30. The "directors-as-monitors" model was first proposed by Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 165-66 (1977). It
has since been adopted by most legal and business commentators.
31. For a discussion of fiduciary duties among partners, see Anderson, Co,!f!icts ofInterest:
Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. R.Ev. 738, 759-61, 771_-72, 793-94
(1978); Dooley, supra note 8, at 64-65; Scott, supra note 2, at 815.
32. Yet another argument for permitting insider trading might be that it would increase the
quality of board decision-making because independent directors would work harder than they
do today. The huge profit potentials of such a rule would create strong incentives for talented
individuals to come to the board and perform well. This "entrepreneurial reward" prong of
Professor Manne's thesis has been well answered by others. See note 8 supra.
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senior, middle and junior partners, the new board would return to
the old process of hierarchical decision-making and could no longer
claim peer group decision-making superiority. And, given the large
personal stakes that directors would have in corporate affairs, corporations would lose the anticipated benefits of the recent governance
changes. Specifically, the "independent" directors would become
management directors rather than "monitors" and "discipliners" of
management performance. That the market alone did not appear to
monitor adequately was the raison d'etre for installing a majority of
independent directors in our very largest corporations; a rule permitting insider trading would undermine that gain.
III.

TIPPEES OF CORPORATE INSIDERS

How far can liability be extended to persons outside the organization who receive material nonpublic information from insiders?
The Fair Play, Informed Markets, and Business Property rationales
can be logically extended to such "tippees" of corporate directors,
officers, and employees.33 The Internal Efficiency rationale may also
justify tippee liability.
The typical outside recipients of material nonpublic information
are organizations, such as investment and commercial banking firms,
that have regular and on-going relationships with the corporation.
The corporation transmits and the banking firms receive this information with legitimate business purposes in mind and understand
implicitly that the information will remain confidential. Undoubtedly, an insider may casually tip a friend on the golf course, but the
effect of such tips is more random and of less magnitude than the
regular and legitimate flow of corporate information to those powerful economic organizations, the large investment and commercial
bankers.
These bankers, like law firms, accounting firms, and financial
printing firms, are "agents" - in the economic sense - of the corpo33. The Fair Play rationale focuses on the inequality of information possessed by the particular persons on each side of a particular trade. Both the insider and the tippee of an insider
take advantage of the nonpublic information knowing that it is unavailable to the person on
the other side of the trade. See text at note 3 Sllpra. The Informed Market rationale emphasizes the rapid flow of corporate information to the overall market (not to particular traders).
Whether the insider or the insider's tippee is presently withholding the information from the
market to obtain trading profits is unimportant because the information is still not flowing into
the market. See text at notes 4-5 S11pra. The Business Property rationale treats the information
simply as the property of the corporation. See text at notes 6-7 Sllpra. The stolen property or
its equivalent can be recovered from either or both the thief (the insider) or the recipient (the
tippee). The corporation's property rights are vindicated in either case.
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ration.34 If the agency organization profits by trading on the information, its indulgence will be "signaled" to the corporate principal
and to others, to its likely detriment. Agency organizations, however, rarely breach their obligations to keep the confidences secret
after a conscious organizational decision to do so. More often, the
cause of the agent's breach lies with individuals or subunits in the
agent's own organization. These individuals or subunits are usually
acting detrimentally to the agent's organization.
United States v. Newman, 35 a recent decision, provides the paradigm fact pattern. The defendant's alleged coconspirators, who held
key positions at two prominent investment banking firms, allegedly
conveyed confidential information to the defendant concerning prospective tender offers received by their firms as agents of the bidders.
The defendant, together with two confederates, then purchased
shares of the target companies. When the proposed takeovers became known to the public and the target's stock predictably increased in value, the conspirators sold out and divided the profits.36
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the legal sufficiency of the federal securities law counts on the ground that the
coconspirators misappropriated valuable nonpublic information entrusted to them by their employers, the investment banking firms.
The damage to the investment firms could have been substantial because the conspirators' actions signaled the firms' potential unreliability to the corporate market. As the Court of Appeals stated: "By
sullying the reputations of [the coconspirators'] employers as safe repositories of client confidences, appellee and his cohorts defrauded
those employers as surely as if they took their money.''37 The same
potential damage to law, accounting, and financial printing firms
34. In the strict legal sense, commercial banks are not "agents" of the borrower corporations. See Note, Regulating the Use of Co,!ftdenllaf Ieformation in Tender Offer Financing: A
Common Law Solution, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 838, 856-59 (1981). However, the Note's analysis
fails to account for the fact that corporations deposit funds in the banks from which they
borrow, and a legal agency relationship is created in favor of a depositor with the bank's
"qualified obligation not to reveal confidential information relating to that depositor's accounL" Id at 859.
35. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,332 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981). Accord SEC v.
Lund, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,428 (C.D. Cal Jan. 22, 1982); O'Connor &
Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,443 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1981, amended Jan. 19, 1982).
36. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,332, at 92,050.
37. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 98,332, at 92, 052. The Court sustained the mail
fraud counts in the indictment on the same misappropriation theory coupled with the breach
of the employees' fiduciary duties by material misrepresentations to the employer and material
nondisclosures of their buying activities (which they were specifically required to report).
[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) , 98,332, at 92,053-54.
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representing corporate clients would be inflicted by errant lawyers,
accountants, or "make-up" employees.
The tippee thus appears to have "damaged" both the agent's organization and the business corporation from which the information
emanated. The client corporation might assert claims against the
agent institution and the latter's disloyal employee? 8 and the agent's
stockholders or partners might sue the g1,1ilty individual or subunit of
the organization in a derivative action. If we allow such claims, are
we too far afield from the objective of preventing organizational
damage to the business corporation from which the information emanated? The answer should be in the negative, if we candidly admit
that the primary purpose of insider trading liability is deterrence
rather than compensation.39 The risk that the disloyal individuals
will pay twice for their conduct will serve that purpose. Extending
liability to tippees might also remove further incentives for the insider to delay or distort the upward transmission of information
within the corporation. The objectives of the Internal Efficiency rationale are accurate and timely internal transmission of information
38. The claim by the client corporation is supported by traditional state agency law. An
agent is required to account to the principal for any profit gained through the use of confidential information, even if the principal was not harmed. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 338, Comment c (1958). The claim by the corporation (the "principal") can be
asserted against both the agent organization (the legal "agent") and its disloyal employee (a
legal "subagent"). See w. SELL, AGENCY 17 (1975).
39. The focus of this Article is on insider trading on the national securities markets, not on
face-to-face transactions between the insider and another. In the anonymous market, the insider says or does nothing except to call his broker to buy or sell. The person on the other side
of the trade is there fortuitously through his broker. This "public trader'' would have traded
anyway, and most likely at or near the same price. That public trader, as well as all other
public traders thereafter, traded at the prices they did, not because of the insider's trade but
because of the nondisclosure of material information that, if disclosed, would have affected the
prices of all trades. Had the insider not traded at all, all the trading that occurred likely would
have occurred anyway, and at the same (or very similar) prices. See note 3 supra; Dooley,
supra note 8, at 33. But see Mendelson, supra note 8, at 485-86; Wang, supra note 8, at 123440. And neither the nontrading insider nor the company would have incurred liability to any
traders because rule IOb-5 does not mandate disclosure of material nonpublic information.
The obligation of the insider to "disclose or abstain" from trading on material nonpublic information reduces to a ban on insider trading. Thus, the idea of "compensating" the public
trader on the other side of the trade with the insider, or the public traders who transacted
"contemporaneously" with the insider, or who transacted from that time until disclosure to the
public of the material information does not comport with the realities of the anonymous securities markets. The Internal Efficiency rationale could provide a basis for compensatory damages, but the amount of damages sustained by the corporation in a particular case would be
difficult to establish.
Thus, if an insider who trades on material nonpublic information is held to be liable, the
primary basis must be deterrence, not compensation. The New York Court of Appeals in
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969),
enunciated this policy with respect to insider trading: "Only by sanctioning such a cause of
action will there be any effective method to prevent the type of abuse of corporate office complained of in this case."
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and high quality decisions; whether the insider or the insider's tippee
causes the adverse effects is irrelevant.

IV.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERNAL EFFICIENCY
RATIONALE

The argument that a free insider trading rule would adversely
affect the corporation's efficiency and decision-making has legal implications that this Part of the Article considers. First, the proposition goes beyond the Business Property rationale by providing a
basis for asserting injury to the corporation in every case of insider
trading. As Professor Scott observes, the Business Property rationale
"implies that the injured party is the company."40 He concludes that
this rationale cannot be extended to all cases because not every personal use of confidential corporate information has the potential to
injure the corporation. His "impression is that application [of the
insider trading ban] to protect investments in socially valuable discoveries is justifiable, but beyond that the case becomes increasingly
dubious."41 Scott includes as socially valuable discoveries "new
mineral deposits and companies that could be made more productive
and profitable."42 However, the Internal Efficiency rationale that
this Article suggests applies to all cases of insider trading based on
material nonpublic information because of the internal distortions
that such trading would likely cause. Since any exceptions to a rule
prohibiting insider trading may undermine corporate efficiency and
the quality of decision-making, liability under the rationale would
be more expansive.
Second, because the Internal Efficiency rationale: (a) focuses exclusively on the internal affairs of the corporation; and (b) asserts
that the corporation is injured, its federal concerns are almost nonexistent and its state concerns are strong. The national securities markets and the trading public have been traditional federal concerns at
least since 1934, when Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act.
The Act contains the two principal provisions relevant to insider
trading, sections lO(b) and 16(b). Rule lOb-5, promulgated under
section lO(b), is the source of the present "disclose or abstain" rule,
which in effect prohibits insiders from trading on the basis of material nonpublic information.43 Both the Fair Play and Informed Mar40. Scott, supra note 2, at 805.
41. Id at 818.
42. Id at 815.
43. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), on remand, 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
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ket rationales focus upon the national securities markets and the
trading public. Either rationale, if accepted, provides a basis for federal enforcement under rule IOb-5. The Business Property and Internal Efficiency rationales focus on the corporation's interests, a
concern that is rather far removed from the national securities markets. And, as the Supreme Court has reminded us, the internal affairs of the corporation are matters "traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States . . . ."44 The coexistence of state and federal remedies, therefore, may depend on
which rationales the courts accept.
Third, because the Internal Efficiency rationale posits that the
corporate entity is injured, the applicable civil legal enforcement device is a shareholder's derivative suit against the inside traders, with
the recovery going to the corporation.45 The derivative suit is also
appropriate because deterrence - the primary goal of derivative
suits46 - and compensation - a secondary goal - precisely parallel
the relative purposes of a rule prohibiting insider trading. But a federal derivative suit based on the Internal Efficiency rationale would
not be available because of the limitation of suits under rule l0b-5 to
purchasers or sellers of securities.47
1910), '!ffd in part, revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
44. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
45. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.B.2d 910
(1969); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949).
46. S~e Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival ofthe JJerivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Propo•
salfor Legislative Reform, 81 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 261, 302-09 (1981).
These three objections - the likelihood of share transfers between the time of the
wrong and that of the recovery, the lack of congruence between corporate gains and losses
and those of shareholders, and the trivial size of the t¥Pical recovery on a pro-rated basis
- do not imply that compensation is an illusory or msignificant goal. But they do cast
considerable doubt on its ability to serve as the central rationale of the derivative action.
In contrast, a deterrent rationale for the derivative action is not significantly affected
by these problems. From a deterrent perspective, it matters less who gets the recovery
than who pays it; sanctions have a role independent of their ability to make victims whole.
In addition, the derivative action is in some ways naturally adapted to a deterrent rationale, principally because it harnesses private enforcement resources and focuses its penalties on the individual rather than the corporation.
Id at 305 (footnote omitted).
41. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Ratner, Federal and
State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAW. 947, 957, 960 (1976). In Blue
Chip, the Court held that only a purchaser or seller (of securities) has standing to bring a
private action for damages under rule lOb-5 (the rule). Since the corporation is usually not a
purchaser or seller with respect to the insider's trades on the securities market, it has no standing to sue the insider. See, e.g., Davidge v. White, 377 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). It
necessarily follows that a stockholder's derivative suit on behalf of the corporation for insider
trading under the rule is foreclosed by Blue Chip.
Blue Chip reaffirmed the long-standing Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement formulated
by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum rule was subject to some exceptions, including pri-
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Fourth, because detection may be extremely difficult, the most
realistic method to deter insider trading might be to provide for corporate recovery of double or treble the amount of the insider's profit
or loss avoidance.48 This would require a new statute in most states,
vate suits for injunctive relief. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 103638 (4th ed. 1977); Note, Standing Under Rule J0b-5 Afler Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REv.
413 (1976). The lower courts after Blue Chip have continued to recognize the Birnbaum exceptions. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 868 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 905,913 (1978); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir.
1976) (dictum); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1357-59 (N.D.
Tex. 1979).
The point of this is that the Supreme Court, consistent with the policies enunciated in Blue
Chip, could, ifit were so disposed (an unlikely proposition), permit a shareholder's derivative
action to enforce the rule's ban on insider trading. In Blue Chip, the Court discussed certain
policy considerations in support of restricting private damage claims under the rule to actual
purchasers or sellers. Principal among them was ''the danger of vexatious litigation which
could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs. . . ." 421 U.S. at 740. Specifically, the
Court cited ''the potential for nuisance or 'strike' suits in this type of litigation," and noted that
"the abolition of the Birnbaum rule would throw open to the trier of fact many rather hazy
issues of historical fact the proof of which depended almost entirely on oral testimony." 421
U.S. at 740, 743. A derivative claim for insider trading under the rule would not present these
risks: The violation of the rule would be clear, and the trading transaction by the insider
defendant and the amount of the profit would be established by documentary evidence. Thus,
the danger of strike suits brought without merit and the risks of large liability turning on
plaintiffs' testimony would not exist. ''The fact of purchase of stock and the fact of sale of
stock are generally matters which are verifiable by documentation, and do not depend upon
oral recollection. •.." 421 U.S. at 742. Indeed, defendants have been required to disgorge
their insider trading profits in suits brought by the SEC under the rule. See,·e.g., SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), qffd. in part, revd. in part and remanded
on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); SEC v.
Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
A derivative suit under the rule, with the insider's profit going to the corporation, is a
"neat" solution to the problems of private damage claims for insider trading. The courts have
been struggling for years with the questions of who has been harmed by the insider's trade and
the extent of the harm. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228,241 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit suggested that the persons harmed might include all
persons who traded on the side of the market opposite the insider from the time of the insider's
trade (or tip to another) until the time the material nonpublic information was publicly disclosed and disseminated by the company, even though the insider might thereby sustain "Draconian liability." 495 F.2d at 242. But cf. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 326 (6th Cir.
1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring) (suggesting that only the traders who bought from or sold to
the insider could sue the insider, or, at most, those that traded "contemporaneously'' opposite
the insider's side of the market), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). In Elkind v: Liggett &
Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 173 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit retreated from Shapiro and
limited the insider's damage liability to his profit (or loss avoidance), which all contemporaneous traders might share. These varying "solutions" try to come to grips with the difficulty or
impossibility of locating, on the national securities markets, the particular person on the opposite side of the trade with the insider. Further, there are substantial doubts whether that person, even if located, was damaged by the insider's trade because he would have traded on the
anonymous market in any event, at or near the same price. See notes 3 and 39 supra; Dooley,
supra note 8, at 33. But see Mendelson, supra note 8, at 485-86; Wang, supra note 8, at 123440.
48. See
CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 728-29 (5th ed. unabr. 1980) (difficulty of detecting insider trading). Professor Dooley argues that enforcement of the insider
trading prohibition has been ineffective and costly, and the sanctions arbitrary. See Dooley,
supra note 8, at 19-20, 24-25, 68, 73. He ultimately concludes that retention of "[t]he existing
system •.• is indefensible." Id. at 73. But when he focuses solely on enforcement of the
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unless the state courts allowed punitive damages. A corporate recovery of the pro.fit under state law coupled with an individual suit or
class action under rule lOb-5 for the same amount based on viable
Fair Play or Informed Market rationales might effectively hold out
the threat of a double recovery.49 Indeed, this may be the present
law applicable to New York corporations. In .Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 50 the New York Court of Appeals upheld a derivative
suit under state law for insider trading, with the corporate recovery
measured by the pro.fit (or loss avoidance) that the insiders realized.
In a federal action under rule lOb-5 today, the insiders can be required for deterrence purposes to disgorge their pro.fits into a court
fund against which public traders might claim.51 Despite the New
York court's desire to avoid a double recovery, 52 the existence of
parallel, but nonexclusive, federal and state claims for insider trading may well strike the proper deterrent balance and also satisfy, in a
broad sense, the independent "compensatory'' claims of the corpoprohibition, he concludes that a "a fine system based on a multiple of trading profits probably'
would be most effective." Id. (footnote omitted).
49. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503-04, 248 N.E.2d 910, 91S, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78, 85-86 (1969) (state remedies can supplement federal remedies); 83 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 1421, 1430 (1970); 1970 Wis. L. R.Ev. 576, 584-8S.
50. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). ./Jiamond has not been
adopted in any other state. In Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975), the Florida
Supreme Court refused to adopt the ./Jiamond rationale. "[A]ctual damage to the corporation
must be alleged in the complaint to substantiate a stockholders' derivative action." In Free•
man v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1978), the court stated that the Indiana courts would
most likely refuse to adopt ./Jiamond. It characterized ./Jiamond as a decision that "can best be
understood as an example ofjudicial securities regulation." 584 F.2d at 196 (footnote omitted).
Further, the ./Jecio court considered any asserted harm to corporate goodwill as speculative.
Such harm was a basis for the ./Jiamond decision. In ./Jiamond, the court stated:
[D]espite the lack of any specific allegation of damage, it may well be inferred that the
defendants' actions might have caused some harm to the enterprise. . . . When.officers
and directors abuse their position in order to gain personal profits, the effect may be to
cast a cloud on the corporation's name, injure stockholder relations and undermine public
regard for the corporation's securities.
24 N.Y.2d at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82. This Article argues that whatever
external effects insider trading has on the corporation or the securities markets, it will adversely affect the internal efficiency of the corporation.
The leading incorporation state of Delaware, in a decision predating ./Jiamond, has ruled
that a corporation could recover the insider trading profit of an employee who purchased stock
with inside knowledge that the corporation would engage in a stock buy-in program on the
open market The employee sold his stock at a profit after the corporation's purchases
foreseeably drove up the stock price. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 246-47, 70
A.2d 5, 8 (1949). It is an open question whether the Delaware courts would adopt ./Jiamond in
the typical insider trading case, where the corporation does not buy or sell its stock close to the
time of the insider's trades.
51. See, e.g., SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257,260 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 92-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), ajfd inparl, revd in part and
remanded on other gro1111ds, 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 100S (1971).
52. The Court suggested instead that the defendants might protect themselves from multiple actions by looking to the state's interpleader law. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
504, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
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rate entity and of the traders in the national securities markets. The
courts could also add criminal prosecution under certain state statutes to the deterrence formula. 53
CONCLUSION

Intellectual ferment about insider trading is on the rise once
again. The reasons are clear: The considerations are complex and
the relevant empirical evidence sparse. An additional perspective
should be added to the complex mix: What are the effects, if any, of
various insider trading rules on decision-making and efficiency in
the large corporation? The Internal Efficiency rationale suggests that
allowing insider trading would have adverse effects of a pervasive
and systemic nature upon internal decision-making and efficiency.
If this rationale were accepted as the sole basis for prohibiting
insider trading, which this Article has not urged, then the legal consequence might be to commit enforcement to state derivative suits.
However, if the Fair Play (or "integrity of the markets") or Informed
Market rationale is accepted as sufficient support for the present federal rule, the Internal Efficiency rationale can be viewed as icing on
the federal cake or as a new basis for a separate and additional derivative claim under state law, with deterrence as the goal. In any
event, the end purpose of the instant effort is to fuel analysis and
empiricism on the rationale that this Article has offered.

53. Many states have enacted laws containing anti-fraud provisions modeled on Rule
I0b-5 ..•. A number have adopted Section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act, which is
substantially identical with l0b-5, and also Section 410, which provides for express liability. (Section 4 lO(h) is designed to assure that no civil cause of action may be implied from
§ 101). Some states prescribe civil liability for violation of § 101 equal to that implied
under Rule l0b-5, or may afford the possibility of implying a civil remedy. See Shermer
v. Baker, 2 Wash. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970).
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 48, at 718. Section 101 would provide the basis for a
state criminal prosecution, provided the state courts were willing to read the section as proscribing insider trading based on material nonpublic information, as the federal courts have
done under rule lOb-5. Similarly, courts in certain states could provide an implied civil remedy for insider trading under ~e particular version of the Uniform Securities Act adopted in
those states. Id at 1333-34.
Obviously, federal criminal prosecution under rule lOb-5 would promote deterrence.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), exemplifies a relatively strong disposition of
the Department of Justice towards prosecution, particularly because the defendant was a lowlevel employee in a financial printing firm. Although the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, the government thereafter indicted a coconspirator whose investment banking firms were
entrusted by bidders with information concerning the future targets of tender offers, and the
Second Circuit sustained the sufficiencies of the indictment United States v. Newman, [Current) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 98, 332 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981).

